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Abstract 
The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a very highly established methodology for preventing failures in technical 
systems [1] that developed over the last five decades. It became a standard tool, especially since the introduction to the automotive 
industry via the QS-9000. 
Despite of numerous successful applications the FMEA is limited to normal expectations of occurring failures (like the non-
fulfilment of a function or small deviation from an expected value) [2]. The FMEA utilizes the breakdown structure for products 
or processes to identify single failure causes and effects. 
Usually the FMEA provides no consideration of interconnected failures and failure scenarios. 
There are a lot of good reasons for the usage of the FMEA: it is wide spread because of being a part of international standards and 
engineering education for a long time. To cover these drawbacks described above, additional tools for risk analysis and risk 
management can be used. 
The Anticipatory Failure Prediction as preventive component of the Anticipatory Failure Determination (AFD) is such a method 
that leads to a comprehensive set of failures and failure scenarios [3], [4]. 
Additionally it provides procedures to “invent” possible failures in a structured but creative way [5]. Based on the analysis of both 
methods, ways to hybridize the methods are developed. This hybridization leads to the combination of the advantages of both 
methods (similar to the parallel execution of both methods), offers synergies, and expands the potential for industrial adoption by 
providing one elaborated tool. By using an application example the potential of the hybridized AFD-FMEA or so called Failure 
Mode and Effects Anticipation and Analysis (FMEAA) is pointed out. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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This paper is about the hybridization of the well-known preventive quality method Failure Mode and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) and the TRIZ-based methodology Anticipatory Failure Determination (AFD). First an 
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introduction to both methods will be given and the underlying standards will be described. Than a closer look at each 
method will explain how the methods work. In chapter five an approach of hybridization of the two methods is 
given and an example provided. The structure of the paper is shown in Fig. 1. 
 
Fig. 1. Paper structure 
1. FMEA and AFP: valuable tools for risk analysis 
The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is the most established tool for risk analysis and failure 
prevention in engineering. The fact, that FMEA emerged as a standard in this area, is particular the result of the 
implementation by QS- 9000 within the automotive industry [1]. FMEA is hugely useful to identify possible, but 
in some degree expected, failures, e.g. the nonperformance of a function or the minor deviation from an 
expected data [2]. 
Sooner or later every company has to experience that the number of occurred defects is still too high. The impacts 
can either be quite innocent or of particular importance for companies, employees, regions or the whole mankind. 
Failures, not expected in the slightest, are particularly fatal. They happen, when the cause of trouble cannot be derived 
directly from the product- or process structure. Moreover, the combination of several errors can cause more serious 
impacts, than each error itself. 
Anyway, locating possible and future failures is by no means automatism, but rather a procedure, that requires, 
besides a systematic approach, lots of creativity and inventive talent. According to Frenklach it requires not only 
asking the characteristically FMEA- questions “why” and “what”, but furthermore asking the question “how” several 
times [6]. 
Anticipatory Failure Determination (AFD) encourages these questions. To invent failures, by inverting the 
problem, enables us to use other TRIZ tools for revealing hidden failures mechanisms and for predicting unexpected 
future failures. Using TRIZ tools allows us to achieve innovative preventive measures respectively preventive system 
designs. Examples from different fields of application prove the success of this procedure (e. g. [6],[7],[8],[9],[10]). 
Hereafter this preventive aspect will be defined as AFD Failure Prediction (AFP). 
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Based on Altshullers insight that TRIZ offers powerful approaches for different scopes including research and 
development [11], the evolution of AFD is affected by the work of other well known names e.g. Zlotin and Zusman 
creating AFD method in the early eighties introducing the inversion and operators as key elements [3] or V. 
Mitrofanov who worked on problems regarding waste elimination in manufacturing using the principle of 
intensification. The evolution of the AFD is shown in detail in the book “How to deal with failures (The smart way)” 
[5]. 
The implementation of the main AFP idea can be done by using different TRIZ tools and different levels of 
standardization. Promising lines of action and potential software support exist and are published (e.g. [3], [4], [5]). But 
as a matter of fact, Anticipatory Failure Determination in general is still one of the TRIZ tools that is not used very 
frequently [12]. 
Both FMEA and AFP are valuable tools for risk analysis and failure prevention even if they have different scopes. 
So it may make sense to use both methods complementary – e.g. Ungvari gives some suggestions, which steps of an 
AFP may be performed accompanying specific steps of the FMEA [4]. 
This work is based on such thoughts and shows the development of a hybridized method. So the aim is to not just 
combine the advantages of both methods – continuing the synthesis of FMEA and AFP ONE method – respectively 
ONE tool – shall be developed. And to increase the chance of its adoption, usability (as well as “look & feel”) shall be 
very similar to specific, actual and common standards. 
2. Underlying standards 
The whole automotive supply chain pushes the standardization of method usage within the German and European 
engineering and quality management. The allotted standards are adopted rapidly outside of these supply chains as 
well, because they are very detailed, elaborated and usable. Furthermore for most companies the impact of fulfilling 
the automotive industries needs is vitally important to acquire new customers. 
Therefore we apply the most important actual description of standards in this context– the VDA Handbook on 
Quality Management (Part 4: Quality assurance, especially risk analysis, methods, and procedures) [13]. In this book 
the FMEA is illustrated on 126 pages with very detailed descriptions of the history, different approaches and steps and 
examples. This demonstrates the high level of sophistication. This will be used as the specific base of this work 
regarding the FMEA. 
In the same book there is a chapter called “TRIZ”. This so far does not reflect any actual practice – it’s a first 
introduction to the topic and shows a lot of insights and tools in a very superficial manner. So in contrast to the FMEA 
the sub-section on the AFP there takes just about three-fourths of one page. This illustrates that TRIZ and especially 
AFG are still very exclusive approaches (e.g. in Germany [ ]. The use of AFP is still a tool of experts. 
In conclusion: in the observed field there is a well elaborated standard regarding the FMEA that will be used for 
the hybridization. And there is no existing standard regarding the AFP –in the targeted field AFP is just known by 
some experts and is executed using different procedures. 
3. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
According to VDA [13] the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is conducted in five steps. 
These steps are: 
x Structure Analysis (Step 1) 
x Function Analysis (Step 2) 
x Failure Analysis (Step 3) 
x Action Analysis (Step 4) 
x Optimization (Step 5) 
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Step 1 and Step 2 can be executed in parallel, steps 3-5 should be done sequentially. An overview of the 
structure analysis to the failure analysis can be seen in Fig. 2. More detailed information on how to conduct a 
FMEA are available from McDermott et al [1], Däuble et al. [17], and VDA [13]. 
 
 
Fig. 2. FMEA overview according to [17] 
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3.1. Action Analysis 
Goals of the action analysis are: 
x Allocate existing or already taken actions to failure functions 
x Rank the risk of the single failure 
The actions are separated into two groups: actions for prevention of failures and actions for failure detection. 
Preventive actions during the development phase are used for process planning to reduce the probability of the 
failure occurrence. Preventive actions must be written clearly and comprehensibly, if necessary referred to a 
further document. Detection actions are used to find possible failures and to confirm the effectiveness of the 
taken actions. Similar, the detection actions must be written clearly and comprehensibly and may refer to a separate 
document, too. 
Attached to the actions are a person responsible and an appointed date to secure the settlement of the action 
before serial production starts. 
The state of settlement is set to: 
x Untreated: collection of ideas, work on the action has not started yet. 
x Decision: the action is defined, decision was not made. 
x Implementation: decision about the action was made, but the action was not implemented yet. 
x Closed: closed actions are settled, the effectiveness was proven and documented, and a final evaluation was made. 
x Refused: refused actions are documented and need commonly an optimization. 
 
3.2. Evaluation of the risk 
The risk correlated to each failure is rated regarding the taken actions for prevention and detection. 
The rating is entered in the FMEA sheet. There is: 
 
S Severity of the failure effect 
O Probability of the failure occurrence 
D Probability of failure detection 
For ranking S, O, and D the numbers 1-10 are used, where 10 marks the highest contribution to the risk. The 
severity rating is an estimation of how serious an effect would be if a given failure did occur. In some cases it is 
clear how serious the problem would be, because of past experience. In other cases it is necessary to estimate the 
severity based on the knowledge and expertise of the team members. The best method for determining the 
occurrence rating is to use the actual data from the process. This may be in the form of failure logs or even 
process capability data. When actual failure data are not available, the team must estimate how often a failure 
mode may occur. The detection rating describes how likely it is to detect a failure or the effect of a failure. This is 
done by identifying the current controls that may detect a failure or failure effect. If there are no current controls the 
likelihood of detection will be low and the item will receive a high ranking of 9 or 10. 
 
The risk priority number (RPN) is calculated from severity, occurrence, and detection by multiplying the single 
numbers: 
RPN = S x O x D        (1) 
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The risk priority number gives a first idea at which failures one has to look first (for example all RPN>125 
or the upper 40 or 50%). Beside this the single entries of the numbers have to be regarded as well. If the detection 
is 10, it does mean that the failure will not be detected at all. Something has to be defined to detect the failure. 
Same with occurrence: if the occurrence is 10 (even if severity is a middle five, the detection is high with one 
and the resulting RPN of 50 would not indicate that an action is necessary) some actions must be defined to 
reduce the likelihood of failure occurrence. 
3.3. Optimization 
Goals of the optimization are: 
x Definition of necessary actions for improving the system. 
x Estimation of the risk. 
x Prove the effectiveness of the taken actions. 
x Documentation of the settled actions. 
If the initial state of the risk evaluation of a failure mode is not sufficient, new actions are proposed. These 
actions are treated according to step 4. A new state for risk evaluation is created. The actions are ranked in 
advance, responsible persons and due dates are defined. After execution of these actions the effectiveness is 
evaluated, too. Does an action not provide the targeted result the process is repeated until a sufficient result is 
reached. The optimization should track the following order: 
x Change the process to exclude the failure cause or to gain a failure effect with little severity. 
x Improve the stability of the process to minimize the likelihood of occurrence of the failure cause. 
x Improve the detection of the failure. 
Changes in the process lead to a new FMEA going through all five steps again for the changed area of the 
process. The following table shows the look of a risk evaluation of a failure (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Failure effect 
 
S 
 
Failure mode 
 
Failure Cause
 
Prevention action
 
O
 
Detection action 
 
D 
 
RPN 
Resp./ 
Date
 
Drive shaft produced 
with failures 
[Main process drive 
shaft] 
8 Roughness depth not
produced according to
spec 
[Grinding process 
for bearing seat and 
running tread for 
shaft sealing ring] 
 
 
Peripheral  surface
speed too low 
[Grinding 
machine] 
 
 
Use well tested drive
for the grinding 
machine 
2  
 
Online control of 
peripheral  surface 
speed 
2 32  
Fig. 3. Risk evaluation of a failure mode [17] 
 
4. Anticipatory Failure Prediction – AFP 
Since there is no AFP-standard this work will refer to the detailed process description of S. Visnepolschi (one 
of the authors of this work). This process includes the following eight steps [5]: 
Step 1: Obtaining information 
In this first step the expectations for the AFP project have to be defined. Usually there is the need for a 
“practically safe” system – a system that will not collapse, injure anyone or cause some trouble for the responsible 
persons or institutions [14]. After this definition a set of well-proven questions supports the gathering and/or 
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creation of necessary information. These questions help to explore the system of interest, its structure, its 
functioning, undesired effects, its environment and the history of the system. 
 
Step 2: Developing a System Diagram 
The System Diagram visualizes cause-and-effect connections in the functioning of the system. The favoured 
notation is based on the problem formulation notation [15] [16]. So the system diagram for the AFP should include 
the useful and harmful functions (or operations). In this case an important event or a meaningful state of the system 
may also be considered as a “function”. The functions are the knots of the diagram that are connected by cause-
effect links. The diagram also indicates the primary useful function of the system. An example is given in Fig. 4. 
 
Fig. 4. Example System Diagram [5] 
Step 3: Identifying Focal Points 
Focal Points are the zones or weak points of the system that may cause the biggest weakness of the system or 
the greatest danger. So using the system diagram the focal points are represented by useful functions that lead to 
big weakness and harmful functions that cause great danger. Typically focal points in the system diagram have a 
high number of incoming and outgoing links and are strongly connected with the systems functioning. The 
approach to concentrate on Focal Points emphasizes the intention to identify the unexpected and especial critical 
failures. 
Step 4: Generating Failure Hypotheses 
The generation of failure hypotheses is divided in two stages: the development of “AFP Directions” and the 
application of Checklists and Operators. 
A systematic way to develop the AFP Directions is given by the consequent utilisation of the SEOR- model 
regarding the Focal Points. SEOR stands for: Source Effect Object Result. An example for the SEOR-Model 
can be described as follows: to destroy (melt) an Object (a plastic pad) the harmful Source (a heating device) 
should be placed close the Object. Conversely: to protect the plastic pad (opposite effect), it should be moved 
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away from the harmful Source (the heating device). The AFP Directions are abstract commands that are challenging 
readers to develop failure hypothesis (e.g.: Find ways to strengthen harmful impact on the Focal Point!). Fig. 5 
shows the SEOR-configurations to formulate the AFP Directions. 
 
Source Object
Effect Result
Effect ResultUseful
Focal Point
Harmful
Source
strengthen
Effect ResultUseful
Focal Point
Harmful
Source
strengthen
Effect ResultUseful
Focal Point
Harmful
Source
weaken
Effect ResultUseful
Focal Point
Harmful
Source
spread
Effect ResultUseful
Object
Harmful
Focal Point
activate
Effect ResultUseful
Object
Harmful
Focal Point
strengthen
Effect ResultUseful
Object
Harmful
Focal Point
weaken
Effect ResultUseful
Object
Harmful
Focal Point
spread  
Fig. 5. SEOR configuration [5] 
Answering the commands of the AFP Directions leads to a first list of failure hypotheses. With this systematic 
approach even more failure hypotheses can be found as just with intuition. 
The Checklists and Operators can now be used to enforce this effect dramatically. This well structured lists (e. g. 
typically hazardous materials, typically hazardous processes, typically hazardous individuals 
...) and Operators (concrete but not specific thought-provoking impulses, derived from different TRIZ- tools 
and experience in AFD) let the list of failure hypotheses expand even more. 
Step 5: Generating Failure Scenarios 
This step continues the search for failures in two ways: Inventing most dangerous failures and combining 
resources of multiple failures. 
Inventing  the  most  dangerous  failures  is  a  procedure  supported  through  particular  checklists. Checklists 
can be found at [5]. It encompasses the attempts to intensify already found possible failures and to explore 
possibilities to hide the failures. The combination of multiple failures helps creating failure scenarios with 
intensified impact on the system. 
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Step 6: Assessing Risks 
The process of evaluating the risks in AFP is based on the definition of hazard and likelihood. But these two 
factors may be used in a different way [5]: 
Regarding the hazard failure hypotheses and scenarios have just to be judged whether they are causing injury to 
human beings, danger to the systems functioning or pollution or not. 
Regarding the likelihood estimation is very hard for potential critical errors that are invented by thinking 
about the most dangerous failures and the combination of different errors. Instead of guessing the likelihood of 
failure exposure the likelihood can be evaluated by the evaluation of the availability of the existing resources that 
are necessary to provide the failure. 
As a result of this consideration failure scenarios and hypotheses can be defined as very important, if they are 
very hazardous and the resources to provide the failure are available (at the moment or under specific but 
possible conditions). Failures not very hazardous but likely to occur or failures very hazardous less likely to occur 
are designated as “second priority”. The lowest priority group includes the failure scenarios and hypotheses that 
are not very hazardous less likely to occur. 
Step 7: Preventing Probable Failures 
The prevention of the failures should be started by developing a system diagram (see step 2) for each failure 
hypothesis or scenario that is to consider. These diagrams are the starting point to find the solutions to 
prevent the failures. The diagrams show failure mechanism chains and contradictions. Just analyzing these 
diagrams can produce reliable solutions. With the help of checklists, operators or some other TRIZ-tools more 
effective solutions can be developed. 
Operators and checklists for preventing or eliminating the failure are [5]: 
x Removing the source of harm or changing its properties 
x Modifying the harmful effect 
x Counteract the harmful effect 
x … 
Step 8: Evaluating Results 
The evaluation of the results shows if the solution really can be implemented preventing the failure 
completely. To prove that the solutions should be examined in detail – like in the procedure described so far, now 
the solutions have also to be checked with a simplified Express-AFP procedure. 
5. Hybridization of FMEA and AFP: The Failure Mode and Effects Anticipation and Analysis – FMEAA 
Both, the FMEA and the AFP bring advantages for their use. On one hand the FMEA for example the linear process 
for completion that is well accepted and standardized, on the other hand AFP here for example the invention of 
failures that are “out of the box”. Differences and advantages can be seen in comparison at [4], especially the 
synthesis of FMEA and AFD is given as possibilities (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 Potential synthesis of FMEA and AFD [4] 
FMEA Step AFD Integral 
Potential Failure Mode Failure Prediction Mode of AFD 
Cause – effect diagrams for the system (sub-system, component) 
Automatic Inverted Problem formulation 
Automatic access to AFD knowledge base (Checklists and 
Operators) 
Potential Effects of Failure Access to AFD knowledge base, in particular the checklists: 
Destroying the system's resistance to a specific effect 
Making the system vulnerable 
Intensifying the failure 
Masking the failure 
Potential Causes/Mechanisms of Failure Application of Failure Analysis mode of AFD™, in particular: 
Cause – effect diagrams for the system (sub-system, component) 
Localizing the failure 
Automatic Inverted Problem formulation 
Identifying general methods of providing the 
failure 
Identifying components necessary for 
providing the failure 
Revealing components of the failure among the system resources 
Automatic access to AFD knowledge base 
Recommended Actions Application of Prevention and/or Elimination of the Failure mode 
of the AFD, in particular: 
Automatic Problem formulation 
Automatic access to AFD knowledge base, in particular the 
Operators: 
Eliminating the causes of the failure 
Removing the source of harm or change its properties 
Modifying the harmful effect 
Counteracting the harmful effect 
Isolating the system from the harmful effect 
Increasing the system's resistance to the harmful effect 
Modifying or substituting the object effected by harm 
Localizing the harmful effect 
Reducing the harmful effect 
'Blending in' defects 
Transient using of a harmful effect 
 
 
Unfortunately no really hybridization of the tools is given. Regarding literature it is only pointed out that the 
Anticipatory Failure Determination can improve the FMEA, but no way of make “one” method was presented. 
Now we present a way of hybridizing FMEA and AFP where FMEA still takes the stronger part, because: 
x FMEA is a received standard, 
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x people are used to the FMEA, 
x it is quick to learn, 
x we start from a known way of thinking and integrate AFP easily into it, 
x there is no jumping between the single methods. 
 
Fig. 6. Hybridization of FMEA and AFP: FMEA will be the stronger part in hybridizing the tools to the Failure Mode and Effects Anticipatory 
Analysis (FMEAA) 
Drawbacks that might occur from hybridizing in this way instead of using both methods as separate tools next 
to one another may lie on AFP side: 
x not all unexpected failures may be invented (however, outside the AFP such failures are most likely to 
x not being predicted at all) 
x not that detailed checklists and tools may be received (non the less, much more instructive and illustrative than 
any other) 
Therefore we kept the same structure as in the description of the FMEA (see Table 2). 
Table 2 Structure of the hybridization of FMEA and AFP 
 Objective Tools Result 
5.1 FMEAA Structure Modeling the system structure FMEA structure and function tree
AFP checklist 
Basic structure of the system 
Basic information about the 
system 
5.2 Function Analysis Modeling the functions of the 
system 
FMEA Function Analysis 
AFP cause and effect model with
functions 
Model of functions and their 
cause and effect relationship 
5.3 FMEAA Failure Analysis Building the failure structure of 
the system 
FMEA Failure Analysis AFP 
cause and effect model FMEA 
Form sheet 
AFP Focal Points SEOR model 
Failures, invented failures and 
their cause- and-effect-
relationship 
Failure scenarios 
5.4 Action Analysis and risk 
assessment 
Assessing potential risk in the 
system 
FMEA form sheet 
FMEAA risk assessment based 
on AFP risk assessment 
FMEAA form sheet 
FMEAA form sheet with failures 
that need action 
5.5 Optimization Set measurements for potential 
failures with high risk assessment
Creativity techniques TRIZ tools Measurement list to be executed 
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5.1. FMEAA-System Structure 
For this step the system structuring approach of the FMEA is used. Doing so, we already answer the questions 
of the AFP-Questions for obtaining the necessary information “what is the name of the system?” and “what is 
the system structure?”- In addition to the FMEA procedure, we ask the following questions of the AFP 
questionnaire: 
x Are there any drawbacks or side effects? 
x What is around? 
x What is the super system? 
x What is the system history? 
x Asking these additional questions gives us the possibilities to identify more failures and do it quite easily. 
5.2. FMEAA-Function Analysis 
In first step the function analysis is performed like in the FMEA. For each system element functions are 
written down and the function structure is created as well. All these collected functions are considered to be 
“useful” functions (UF) in the meaning of AFP’s system diagram as they are intended to be part of the system for a 
good reason. The Primary Useful Function (PUF) is taken from the UF’s of the first level as in our example like 
“Assembly of the complete product” (see Fig. 7). 
 
 
Fig. 7. System structure and function tree 
Now, the elements of the system structure and the combination of the function tree are transferred to the AFP 
system diagram functions (as knots) and cause-and-effect relationships expressed by links – i.e. arrows (see Fig. 
8). 
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Fig. 8. Function tree in FMEAA notation (according to AFP notation) 
5.3. FMEAA-Failure Analysis 
Now potential failures of the functions are collected, as we usually do in the FMEA. The failures are attached 
to the functions they belong to (Fig. 9). The structure of the failures is created according to the function diagram. 
As one can see parts of the failure structure repeat for failures that might cause other failures (e.g. Failure 8 in Fig. 
10). 
 
Fig. 9. Functions and attached failures 
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Fig. 10. Failure structure 
Next, to transmit the failures to the system diagram, three steps must be accomplished: 
Step 1: Insert failures and failure modes as harmful functions related to the useful functions in the AFP diagram 
(Fig. 11). 
Step 2: Ask the questions “does a failure cause another failure?” and “is a failure caused by another failure?” 
for each failure in the diagram. If you can answer the question with ‘yes’, draw the cause-effect link between the 
failures (Fig. 12). 
Step 3: Fill in the FMEA form sheet. 
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Fig. 11. Step 1: Failures (harmful functions) attached to useful functions (partial view) 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. FMEAA system diagram including all cause and effect connections 
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Filling the form sheet can be divided into several sub procedures:  
Step 3.a: 
Search for failure chains containing three parts and insert them to the form sheet (see Fig. 13). 
Step 3.b: 
Complete chains of two failures and single failures for failure effects and failure cause and insert the new 
failures into diagram and form sheet (see Fig. 13). 
 
Step 3.c: 
Search for Focal Points. This sub process realizes the AFP approach to create failure hypotheses. In contrast to 
the AFP we recommend to follow just two ways to identify focal points: 
x Focal Points are points at the system diagram that have many arrows (incoming and outgoing) [5] and Points 
accumulation or concentration of substance, energy or information; crossing points; zones of conflict or just 
points with “bad reputation” [3]. To identify those points use the notes made at chapter 3.1 “History of the 
product and known drawbacks”. 
Step 3.d: 
Now invent failures for the focal points. Use the SEOR model to create this failure hypotheses and scenarios. 
As a result you will receive new failures that have to be added to the system diagram. 
Step 3.e: 
To complete this action, you have to repeat the action described at steps 3.a and 3.b. That is: the now added 
failures establish new failure chains, couples or single failures. The mentioned steps are essential to complete these 
chains and to bring all the new information about failures hypotheses and scenarios into the FMEAA form sheet. 
At this point it is important to flag the entries on the form sheet that arise from this step 3.e (e. g. using another 
line colour in the spreadsheet or an indicating column “FP”). So an FMEAA instruction has to include the 
subject how to utilize the SEOR model. For this purpose the SEOR model checklists [3] can be applied. Amongst 
others there are checklists for: 
 
x Typical Harmful Impacts 
ż Mechanical 
ż Thermical 
ż Chemical 
ż  … 
x Typical Sources of High Danger 
x Typical Disturbance of Flow 
x Typical Functional Failures 
x Typical Resources Capable of Producing Harmful impact 
x … 
For detailed information about the checklists see [3] and [5]. 
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Fig. 13. Completion of failure chains 
 
 
Source Function FailureEffect S Failuremode FailureCause
Partial
assembly
step1
Failure1 Failure2 Failure5
Partial
assembly
step1
Failure1 Failure3 Failure13
Partial
assembly
step1
Failure1 Failure3 Failure14
… … … …
FP Machine
fulfills
function9
Material
might
corrodein
use
cleaningchemicals
remainonpartand
saltwaterfrom
environment
washing
processis
insufficent
 
Fig. 14. Example for filling the form sheet (failures coming from inventing failures are marked by FP for Failure Prediction) 
5.4. Action Analysis and risk assessment 
The action analysis for the ‘normal’ failures is carried out like in the FMEA by noting down the taken actions 
for prevention and detection. Based on this the ratings for severity, occurrence, and detection are entered and the 
Risk Priority Number is calculated. 
The failures marked with ‘FP’ are considered on another way of risk assessment that is more close to the AFP – 
but the result has to match with the standard FMEA calculations. 
x The detection probability ‘D’ by definition is rated as a ‘ten’, because the ‘FP’-failures we look at are the 
unexpected ones and naturally no detection action was taken for that. 
x For the occurrence ‘O’ we have to assume the likelihood whether the necessary resources for creating the failure 
are available or not. Fig. 15 shows the occurrence rating choices 
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Description OccurrenceratingO
Morethanoneresourceavailableand
otherscanpossiblyappearundercertain
conditions:ͲͲ>likelytooccur
10
Noresourcesavailable,butsomecan
possiblyappearundercertainconditions:Ͳ
Ͳ>lesslikelytooccur
5
Noresourcesavailableandnotlikelyto
appear(therearenoresourcespresentin
thesituationandthepossiblityoftheir
appearanceiszero)
0
 
Fig. 15. Assessing the occurrence for Failure Prediction 
Same has to be fulfilled for the severity of a failure. Fig. 16 gives an overview on how to rank the severity S 
for failures of the failure prediction. 
 
Description SeverityS
Veryhazardous
Failureiscapableof
ͲCausinginjurytohuman
ͲPollutingtheenvironment
ͲJeopardizingthesystemsfunction
ͲMakinganyotherseriousimpact
(definedparticularintheindivdualcase)
10
Notveryhazardous
Allotherfailures
0
 
Fig. 16. Assessment of the severity S 
The form sheet with the action analysis and the risk assessment is shown below. 
 
 
Source Function FailureEffect S Failuremode FailureCause Preventiveaction O Detectionaction D RPN Resp./Date
Partial
assembly
step1
Failure1 8 Failure2 Failure5 Takenaction#1 4 Measuring
prodedure
DͲ24231
3 96
Partial
assembly
step1
Failure1 8 Failure3 Failure13 9 Partcannotbe
usedinnext
step
2 144
Partial
assembly
step1
Failure1 8 Failure3 Failure14 Takenaction#2 3 Partcannotbe
usedinnext
step
2 48
… … … … 0
FP Machine
fulfills
function9
Material
might
corrodein
use
10 cleaningchemicals
remainonpartand
saltwaterfrom
environment
washing
processis
insufficent
5 10 500
 
Fig. 17. FMEAA form sheet 
 
444   Christian M. Thurnes et al. /  Procedia Engineering  131 ( 2015 )  426 – 450 
5.5. Optimization 
Optimization takes place as in usual FMEA. Looking at Risk Priority Number (RPN), Detection rating, and 
Occurrence rating those failures are picked up, that need improvement. 
The unexpected ‘FP’-failures resulting from the failure prediction regarding the Focal Points may be rated with 
the numbers 1000, 500 or 0. That is: this kind of failures for sure is not considered if the necessary resources 
are not available or the impact of the failure is not very severe. 
At this point anyone may use its own collection of methods to do the optimization. Doubtless TRIZ- methods 
are a good choice at this point and naturally we recommend their application. However, to border the FMEAA 
clearly, we don’t include TRIZ-tools for optimization. 
6. Example 
 
The example will be presented using a lock that is intended to lock doors for privacy reasons like bathroom 
doors or similar. The main structure can be seen in Fig. 18. 
 
Fig. 18. Example product: door lock 
The FMEAA system structure can be defined as following: 
x What is around?: There is the door in that the lock is assembled. 
x What is the super system?: The super system is the room that is used for privacy (e.g. bath room). 
x What is the system’s history?: Design is pretty well know. Some details have been changed due to design 
reasons. 
The functions for the system are analyzed and the function structure is created. 
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Fig. 19. Functions of the system Door lock 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 20. Function tree for the partial function (Give privacy) 
After the structure for the functions of the lock is built, the structure is transferred to the AFP notation shown in 
Fig. 21. 
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Fig. 21. Functions of the lock described in AFP notation 
The typical failures (as they are provided for FMEA) are collected and the failure structure is created. The result 
of this activity is shown in Fig. 22. There the complete connections for the cause-and-effect- relations are 
represented. 
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Fig. 22. FMEAA diagram with functions and failures in cause-and-effect notation (partial view) 
 
For some focal points the AFP approach is conducted and new ideas for failures are invented. Some of the 
questions from the checklists used to invent failures are for example: 
x Determine what typical harm can be provided to [the] (Push button activates mechanism). 
x Try to deteriorate the useful impact of [the] (Push button activates mechanism) on [the] (Block turning 
mechanism of outside knob). 
x Consider additional ways to deteriorate [the] (Push button activates mechanism). 
x Try to increase the vulnerability of [the] (Push button activates mechanism). 
x Consider utilizing the resources of surrounding systems to deteriorate [the] (Push button activates mechanism). 
x … 
Doing this, new failures and with that failure scenarios are invented. For the above mentioned push button for 
example the failure “pressed unintended” can be derived from the questions. The next questions for creating a 
scenario are: what resources within the system are needed to create that failure? We need something to push the 
button and we need some movement to do so. First let’s look for the movement. This can be provided easily by a 
person opening the door or pushing the door by walking through. Second we need something to push the button. 
This can be the wall of the super system or something hanging on the door (like clothes or a bath robe). One 
additional failure is needed to make this scenario happen. The door stop, that is normally there, must be broken or 
missing. With that scenario somebody can close and lock the door unintended from the outside with no person 
inside to open the door again. And now consider even more that one has not an appropriate tool to activate the 
emergency mechanism. The person will not be able to open the door and to access the room. The updated diagram 
with the invented failure can be seen in the next figure. 
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Fig. 23. FMEAA diagram updated with the invented failure (see “pushbutton pressed unintended”) 
With that diagram the FMEAA sheet is derived (Fig. 24). The risk assessment for the invented failure is 10 for 
severity, because it is a main failure of the system’s function. The occurrence is rated with 5, because it is likely 
that the resources needed to produce that failure might occur under certain conditions. The detection is rated 10, 
because for that failure no detection has been provided, yet. 
Looking at that failure scenario a counteracting measurement can be found easily: hide the push button inside the 
knob that way that it can be pressed only with the finger by intention and not by any other item available in the 
surrounding.  
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Fig. 24. FMEAA sheet developed from diagram (partial view with one invented failure scenario) 
 
7. Conclusion 
Bringing two methods together? Integrating methods? Is it possible? This can be answered clearly with ‘yes’. 
FMEAA combines the better of two methods for the advantage of the user. Dealing with (the common) 
failures as before and finding more critical failures within the same process FMEAA is presenting a 
solution. Paying attention to the Focal Points, inventing failures around the Focal Points using the concept of 
resources and the completion of failure chains to create failure hypotheses and even failure scenarios adds some 
essential assets of the AFP to the common FMEA standard. 
These standards are almost kept by the FMEAA. For the typical FMEA user (following the standards given in 
[13]) the new way of identifying system structures and failures is on one hand very close to the common way but 
on the other hand introducing the user to a notation and thinking that is preparing also the usage of TRIZ in later 
stages. 
We rate the FMEAA in this current version as a method in an early stage of its evolution. The work on 
instructions, tests, evaluations and further development of the FMEAA are in progress. Besides the 
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improvement of the FMEAA the adaption of TRIZ as the preferred methodology for the optimization stage is 
also one of the next steps to go. 
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